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Abstract Auction based mechanisms are extremely relevant
in modern day electronic procurement systems since they enable
a promising way of automating negotiations with suppliers and
achieving the ideal goals of procurement efciency and cost
minimization. This article surveys recent research and current
art in the area of auction based mechanisms for e-procurement.
The survey delineates different representative scenarios in
e-procurement where auctions can be deployed and describes
the conceptual and mathematical aspects of different categories
of procurement auctions. We discuss three broad categories:
(1) single item auctions: auctions for procuring a single unit or
multiple units of a single homogeneous type of item; (2) multi-
item auctions: auctions for procuring a single unit or multiple
units of multiple items; and (3) multi-attribute auctions where
the procurement decisions are based not only on costs but also
on attributes such as lead times, maintenance contracts, quality,
etc. In our review, we present the mathematical formulations
under each of the above categories, bring out the game theoretic
and computational issues involved in solving the problems, and
summarize the current art. We also present a signicant case
study of auction based e-procurement at General Motors.
A Note to Practitioners Since the burst of the dot com bub-
ble, many procurement professionals and purchasing managers
have begun to question the ability of the Internet to redene
procurement processes within their rms. In this article we set
out to show that this would be a misplaced sense of deja vu
because the Internet along with a milieu of decision technologies
based on Game Theory and Optimization is proving to be a
signicant tool in the hands of procurement professionals. Sans
all the hype, the dot com phenomena has left behind useful
ideas including that of e-platforms for on-line auctions. Building
upon this core conceptual construct familiar to most procurement
professionals, we set out to survey the exciting eld of research
this has opened up with a vast potential for immediate and
gainful applications. We review the existing state-of-the-art in
this eld, track its recent developments and classify the models
available for different procurement scenarios. We also provide
pointers to areas that require further fundamental as well as
applied research which calls for the attention of not just academic
researchers but also practicing professionals.
Index Terms E-Procurement, negotiations, auctions, single
item auctions, volume discount auctions, multi-item auctions,
combinatorial auctions, multi-attribute auctions, game theory,
mechanism design, NP-hard problems.
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ACRONYMS
PR Purchase Request
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
RFQ Request for Quote
LP Linear Program
IP Integer Program
MIP Mixed Integer Program
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Program
GP Goal Programming
CA Combinatorial Auction
GVA Generalized Vickrey Auction
VCG Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (mechanism)
NP Non-Deterministic Polynomial Time
FPTAS Fully Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme
MAUT Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
MCDA Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
IRDA Iterative Reverse Dutch Auction
I. INTRODUCTION
THE purchasing function and the associated procurementprocesses in organizations, large and small, have tradi-
tionally been an important area of operations affecting busi-
ness performance. In many organizations, procurement costs
constitute a major part of the total costs. For example, about 60
percent of the cost of a car is attributed to procurement costs.
Recent trends in the business environment suggest that the
importance of procurement is being both reinforced through
the emergence of global supply chains and amplified by the
growing incidence of outsourcing in many industrial sectors.
Simultaneously, the procurement function itself has undergone
much transformation. In one large global firm that the au-
thors have worked with, decentralized, factored purchasing
processes have given way to uniform, centralized purchasing
practices, with worldwide purchasing decisions being coor-
dinated by a single centralized organization. These changes
can, in part, be attributed to the influence that information
and communication technologies (ICTs) have had in reshaping
procurement processes both within and between organizations.
The procurement process itself may be hierarchically de-
composed and a first level decomposition yields four distinct
stages: supplier search and analysis, supplier selection stage,
automated transactional stage, and supply chain planning and
control. Many aspects of procurement, in each of the four
stages, have benefited from the application of ICTs and deci-
sion technologies. However, negotiations, which form a crucial
part of the supplier selection stage have so far relied on human
based processes with little technological support. Also, Ne-
gotiation Theory, a framework for reaching decisions through
consensus whenever a person, organization, or any other entity
2cannot achieve its goals unilaterally [1], [2], has traditionally
been a topic of research within the economic and social science
community. However, with recent advances in ICTs, including
the rapid growth of the Internet, an opportunity exists to
automate negotiations that happen at the supplier selection
stage. The design of such automated negotiations requires an
operations research (OR) and computer science/information
systems perspective to feed back into the negotiation models
and procedures devised by the economists and social scientists.
This interdisciplinary research has contributed to three
closely related approaches to automated negotiation systems:
(1) development of negotiation support systems; (2) software
agents for negotiation; and (3) auction mechanism design and
on-line auction platforms. Each of these approaches addresses
the requirements of a wide variety of negotiation scenarios
which is captured in [3] as integrative and distributive negoti-
ations. For descriptions of the first two approaches, we refer
the reader to [4], [5], [6]. Here our focus is on the use of
automated auctions for electronic procurement.
A. Representative Procurement Scenarios
We first describe a few practical procurement scenarios,
based on our experience in working with several major pro-
curement organizations. The scenarios progressively illustrate
the range of complexity in procurement situations: from buy-
ing the proverbial pin (very simple) to a plane (very complex).
1) Scenario A: Single Item Procurement: A Purchase Re-
quest (PR) to buy a specific cutting tool is generated by a
user department, such as Production. This request is commu-
nicated to a central buying department called Purchasing. The
buyer responsible for this category of items acknowledges the
request. If the item is in one of the standard price lists of
vendors already supplying to the organization and a blanket
order already exists then a spot buy order is sent to the supplier.
Otherwise a request for quote (RFQ) is prepared by the buyer
and sent to a selection of suppliers who respond with quotes.
These quotes are analyzed and a sourcing recommendation
is made based on the prices that are quoted. This is a very
simple buying situation where the decision to buy a single
item is made on the basis of a single attribute - price per unit.
Now, consider the same situation as above except that mul-
tiple units of the item are to be bought. The suppliers are now
able to exploit economies of scale and hence provide bids with
volume discounts thereby introducing one level of complexity
in the buyer’s supplier selection or bid selection problem also
sometimes called the winner determination problem.
In the scenario above, very often it is observed that the same
tool is required by many plants across a geographical region or
across all plants worldwide. In such cases the buyer creates a
blanket order which can be used by all the plants. The blanket
order specifies a single price and a delivery point which is
the nearest pickup location operated by a third party logistics
provider on behalf of the manufacturer. Clearly in this case
the sourcing decision involves a greater degree of complexity
since the total cost of procurement - the cost of the item(s)
plus the shipment cost - is to be optimized by the buyer.
The auction mechanisms motivated by this scenario are
discussed in Section III of this paper.
2) Scenario B: Multi Item Procurement: Here is an ex-
tension to scenario A. Purchase requests may be raised by
user departments across the organization for many types of
cutting tools. These requests are processed by a single buyer
responsible for the procurement of cutting tools. The requests
are aggregated and in some cases bundled and an RFQ is
generated. The suppliers respond with bids for bundles which
could indicate volume discounts as well as point prices. The
buyer has to make a decision of allocating the orders so as to
minimize his total cost of procurement as well as restrict the
number of suppliers who receive the orders so as to reduce
management overhead. The decision problem in this case can
be challenging, and in some cases if the number of suppliers
is large then the computations involved can overwhelm the
buyer.
The auction mechanisms relevant for this scenario are
discussed in Section IV.
3) Scenario C: Multi-Attribute Procurement: While it may
be possible to buy cutting tools off-the-shelf by negotiating
along only one dimension - price, buying a machine tool for
a specific machining requirement depends on many attributes.
These may include at least the following: quality of machine
tool, lead time to manufacture and deliver, availability of
spares, maintenance spares to be held in inventory, etc. It may
be possible to attach a monetary value to some or all of the
attributes that influence the purchase decision. In some cases,
additional features and options could be purchased as add-
on components to the basic machine tool from some or all of
the suppliers. Grappling with such multi-attribute procurement
decisions is the raison d’etre of purchasing departments.
The auction mechanisms motivated by the above scenario
are discussed in Section V.
B. Auctions and Electronic Procurement
The field of auctions, as a sub-field of mechanism design, is
concerned with the design of the rules of interaction, using the
tools of game theory and mechanism design [7], [8], for eco-
nomic transactions that will yield some desired outcome. In the
context of negotiations for procurement we require rules gov-
erning: (1) bidding for contracts, (2) the issues and attributes
that will be considered to determine winner(s) of the contract,
(3) determination of winning suppliers, and (4) the payments
that will be made. English auctions, Dutch auctions, and sealed
bid contracts are well understood, widely used economic
mechanisms in the procurement context. Since the rules of
interaction in these auctions are well laid out, they have been
a natural target for automation, and as a result have formed
the core conceptual constructs on which on-line auctions,
like those seen in www.ebay.com, www.onsale.com,
www.freemarkets.com, etc., have been based. In order
to address the software requirements of such on-line auctions,
firms such as Ariba, Emptoris, Frictionless Commerce, etc.
have appeared. These firms have now expanded their software
product portfolio to include more general e-procurement tools.
See http://www.research.ibm.com/absolute/ for more details on
these software vendors.
Many organizations have started using automated auction
technology for procurement. Examples include: Compaq Com-
3puter Corp, General Dynamics, Dutch Railway, General Elec-
tric, Sears Logistics, and Staples Incorporated [9], [10], [11].
For instance, General Electric has adopted on-line auctions
for many of its procurement operations, procuring more than
$6 billion worth of goods and services in on-line auctions in
2000 [10], which led to the Internet Week magazine awarding
it the title ”E-Business of the Year 2000”. Many more firms,
for example, GlaxoSmithKline [12], Metro [13], Volkswagen
[14], and Bechtel [15] have already started using auctions for
a significant share of their procurement operations (up to 30
percent in many of them). A study conducted by the Center
for Advanced Purchasing Studies [16] shows that more than
a third of the firms interviewed by them are procuring goods
in excess of $ 100 million through electronic procurement
auctions. However, in many cases, the only information that
can be gleaned about these implementations is from articles
appearing in the popular press. Detailed case studies, apart
from a few exceptions [17], [18], [19], [11], [20], [21], [22],
[23] have been hard to come by possibly because procurement
is considered to be a key source of strategic advantage and
hence organizations have been unwilling to put the details of
implementation into the public domain.
C. Contributions and Outline of the Paper
The primary motivation for this paper comes from the
key role that auctions have come to play in electronic pro-
curement where they promise a faster convergence to high
quality procurement contracts, even in complex B2B industrial
procurement settings. The secondary motivation arises from
the fact that there are many key results in this area but these
results are spread across a wide body of literature. Motivated
by the above two observations, our goal in this paper is to
provide a comprehensive review of the issues, mathematical
formulations, and the current art in this area, in a self-sufficient
way.
This paper differs from other survey articles that have
appeared on related topics in the following ways.
 This paper is not a survey on auctions in general. There
are widely popular books (for example, by Milgrom [24]
and Krishna [25]) and surveys on auctions (for example,
[26], [27], [28], [29], [30]) which deal with auctions in
a comprehensive way.
 This paper is not a survey on combinatorial auctions
(currently an active area of research). Exclusive surveys
on combinatorial auctions include the articles by de Vries
and Vohra [31], [32], Pekec and Rothkopf [33], and Nara-
hari and Pankaj Dayama [34]. Cramton, Ausubel, and
Steinberg [35] have recently brought out a comprehensive
edited volume containing expository and survey articles
on varied aspects of combinatorial auctions.
 This paper is not a survey on dynamic pricing. There are
excellent surveys on dynamic pricing [36], [37]. As is
well known, auctions represent a particular mechanism
for dynamic pricing.
The focus of our paper is on auction based mechanisms
which can be used as part of an e-procurement process to im-
prove the efficiency of the process. It is therefore closer in its
content to the papers by Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [18], El-
maghraby [38], Bichler, Davenport, Hohner, and Kalagnanam
[23], and Bichler et al [37]. While the papers [18], [38] deal
with combinatorial auctions for procurement together with a
description of a case study, the papers [23], [37] deal with
volume discount auctions and multi-attribute auctions. These
papers deal with certain specific categories of procurement
auctions. In contrast to these papers, our paper provides an
umbrella view of the entire area in a self-sufficient way.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section II: Issues in Electronic Auctions: This section is
intended to present the basic intuition behind auctions and
game theoretic modeling. This section is structured as follows:
[a] Types of Auctions, [b] Design of Auctions [c] Properties
Desired from an Auction [d] Design Space for Auction Mech-
anisms [e] Computational Complexity Issues [f] Relevance of
Game Theoretic and Incentive Issues in E-Procurement.
Sections III, IV, and V: In these three sections, we discuss
three major, broad categories of procurement auctions:
 Single Item Procurement Auctions: Procurement of single
unit or multiple units of a single item based on a single
attribute (Section III)
 Multi-Item Procurement Auctions: Procurement of single
unit or multiple units of multiple items based on a single
attribute (Section IV)
 Multi-Attribute Procurement Auctions: Procurement of
multiple units of a single item based on multiple attributes
(Section V)
In each subsection, we begin by discussing the main issues
involved followed by a detailed discussion of a few best
practice mechanisms from the literature. We conclude each
section with a summarizing discussion on the state-of-the-
art and provide a tabular listing of important current papers
relevant to the topic.
Section VI: A Case Study from General Motors: In this
section, we discuss a real world case study of electronic pro-
curement at General Motors. The last four authors of this paper
were part of a team that developed an auction/optimization
model for this procurement scenario. This case study provides
a solid, recent application of procurement auctions and opti-
mization.
Section VII: Summary and Future Work: We summarize the
contents of this paper and we conclude with a discussion of
some issues that need to be addressed with the current genre
of models and directions for future work.
II. ISSUES IN ELECTRONIC AUCTIONS
In this section, we first briefly discuss different types of
auctions. Next we provide an overview of a game theoretic and
mechanism design setting for design of auctions and present
certain key properties that are required from an auction. We
then present certain important impossibility and possibility
results from mechanism design theory which define the design
space for auction mechanisms. After this, we look at some
computational issues in implementing auctions. Finally, we
bring out the need for and importance of game theoretic
modeling in design of procurement mechanisms. This section
4builds the necessary background for our discussion of pro-
curement auction mechanisms in Sections III, IV, and V. For
a more comprehensive and detailed treatment of auction theory
in general, reader is referred to [26], [27], [29], [39], [24], and
[25].
A. Types of Auctions
An Auction is a mechanism to allocate a set of goods
to a set of bidders on the basis of bids and asks. In a
classical auction, there is an auctioneer who wishes to allocate
a single indivisible item to a buyer from among a group of
bidders. There are four basic types of auctions described in
the literature [26], [27], [29]: Open cry or English auction,
Dutch auction, first price sealed bid auction, and second
price sealed bid auction (also called the Vickrey auction). An
English auction is an iterative auction where the bidders submit
monotonically increasing bids. This iterative process continues
until a price is reached where there is just a single bidder
who is willing to buy. The item is awarded to this buyer at
the final bid price. The Dutch auction is the reverse of the
English auction where the price is monotonically decreased
by the auctioneer until there is a buyer who is willing to buy
at the currently announced price. In both these auctions one
must note that they are iterative in nature and price signals
are continuously being fed back to the bidders. The first and
second price sealed bid auctions however are single round
auctions where bidders submit sealed bids. The winner of
the contract is the bidder who submits the highest bid. The
payment that the winner makes in the First Price sealed bid
auction is the bid price itself. In the second price sealed bid
auction also called the Vickrey Auction [40], the payment that
the winner makes is the second highest bid. This specific
payment rule makes truthful bidding a best response for the
bidders [40]. There is an important result called the revenue
equivalence theorem [26], [27] which states that although these
auction mechanisms are vastly different from each other, they
yield the same expected revenue for the auctioneer when one
item is being sold, under the following set of assumptions:
1) The bidders are risk neutral, in the sense of having linear
utility functions.
2) The valuations of bidders follow the independent pri-
vate values model (this means that the players draw
their valuations for the item from mutually independent
probability distributions)
3) The bidders are symmetric (that is, the valuation distri-
butions are identical)
4) Payments depend only on bids.
Building on these basic types, auctions have evolved rapidly
to include multiple resources, business level constraints, and
more complex market structures. Kalagnanam and Parkes [30]
have suggested a framework for classifying auctions based on
six major factors as outlined below:
(1) Resources: Resources are the entities over which the
negotiation in an auction is conducted. The resources could
be a single item or multiple items, with a single or multiple
units of each item.
(2) Market Structure: There are three types of market
structures in auctions. In forward auctions, a single seller
sells resources to multiple buyers. In reverse auctions, a single
buyer attempts to source resources from multiple suppliers, as
is common in procurement. Auctions with multiple buyers and
sellers are called double auctions or exchanges.
(3) Preference Structure: The preferences define an agent’s
utility for different outcomes in the auction. For example,
when negotiating over multiple units agents might indicate
a decreasing marginal utility for additional units. An agent’s
preference structure is important when negotiation happens
over attributes for an item, for designing scoring rules used to
signal information, etc.
(4) Bid Structure: The structure of the bids within the
auction defines the flexibility with which agents can express
their resource requirements. For a simple single unit, single
item commodity, the bids required are simple statements of
willingness to pay/accept. However, for a multi-unit identical
items setting bids need to specify price and quantity. This
introduces the possibility for allowing volume discounts. With
multiple items, bids may specify all-or-nothing, with a price
on a bundle of items.
(5) Winner Determination: Other phrases which are used
synonymously with winner determination are market clearing,
bid evaluation, and bid allocation. In the case of forward
auctions, winner determination refers to choosing an optimal
mix of buyers who would be awarded the items. In the case
of reverse auctions, winner determination refers to choosing
an optimal mix of sellers who would be awarded the contracts
for supplying the required items. In the case of an exchange,
winner determination refers to determining an optimal match
between buyers and sellers. The computational complexity of
the winner determination problem is an important issue to be
considered in designing auctions.
(6) Information Feedback: An auction protocol may be a
direct mechanism or an indirect one. In a direct mechanism
such as a sealed bid auction, agents submit bids without
receiving feedback, such as price signals, from the auction.
In an indirect mechanism, such as an ascending-price auction,
agents can adjust bids in response to information feedback
from the auction. Feedback about the state of the auction
is usually characterized by a price signal and a provisional
allocation, and provides sufficient information about the bids
of winning agents to enable an agent to redefine its bids.
In this paper, our interest is in procurement auctions with
a specific attention on three broad types: [a] Single item
procurement auctions (single unit or multi-unit), [b] Multi-
item procurement auctions (single unit or multi-unit), and [c]
Multi-attribute procurement auctions.
B. Design of Auctions
The design of auctions can be viewed as a problem of de-
signing a mechanism that implements a social choice function.
Designing a mechanism, in turn, can be viewed as a problem
of designing a game with incomplete information having an
equilibrium in which the required social choice function is
implemented.
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with agent  having a type set  ( 	ff
fi		fl ). The
type set of an agent represents the set of perceived values
of an agent (also called private values). For example, in an
auction, the type of an agent may refer to the valuation that
the agent has for different items up for auction. The two most
common models of valuation used in the context of auction
design are: independent-private-values model and common-
value model [26]. In the independent-private-values-model
model, each bidder knows precisely how much she values the
item. She does not know the valuations of other bidders for
this item but perceives any other bidder’s valuation to be a
draw from a probability distribution. Also, she knows that
the other bidders regard her own valuation as being drawn
from a probability distribution. In the common-value model,
the item being auctioned has a single objective value but
nobody knows its true value. The bidders, having access to
different information sources, have different estimates of the
item’s valuation.
Let  be the Cartesian product of all the type sets of all the
agents (that is  is the set of all type profiles of the agents).
Let ffi be a set of outcomes. An outcome, in the context of
auctions, corresponds to an assignment of auction items to
bidders and the payments to be made to or received by the
bidders. A social choice function is a mapping from  to ffi
and associates an outcome with every type profile. A social
choice function in an auction corresponds to a desirable way
of producing outcomes from given type profiles. Let   denote
the action set of agent  , that is ! is the set of all actions that
are available to an agent in a given situation. A strategy "# of
an agent  is a mapping from  to $ . That is, a strategy maps
each type of an agent to a specific action the agent will choose
if it has that type. In an auction, a strategy corresponds to the
bid the agent will place based on its observed type. Let  be
the Cartesian product of all the strategy sets. A mechanism % is
basically a tuple &' ()	$*	+	ff$,-	/.$&/100 , where . is a mapping
from  to ffi . That is, .$&/10 maps each strategy profile into an
outcome. A given mechanism can always be associated with a
game with incomplete information, which is called the game
induced by the mechanism. For details, refer to [7], [41].
We say that a mechanism %23&4 ()	$*	+	ff$,-	/.$&/100 imple-
ments a social choice function 5 if there is an equilibrium strat-
egy profile &4"#6
(
&/10	ff"76
*
&/10		ff"76
,
& 0fl0 of the game induced by %
such that .$&'")6
(
&98
(
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*
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*
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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for all possible type profiles &:8 ( 	8 * 	+	8 , 0 . That is, a mech-
anism implements a social choice function 5& 0 if there is
an equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism that
yields the same outcomes as 5&/10 for each possible profile
of types. Depending on the type of equilibrium we qualify
the implementation. Two common types of implementations
are dominant strategy implementation and Bayesian Nash
implementation, corresponding respectively to weakly domi-
nant strategy equilibrium and Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The
weakly dominant strategy equilibrium is an extremely robust
solution concept that ensures that the equilibrium strategy of
each agent is an optimal strategy regardless of the strategies
of the rest of the agents. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is a weaker solution concept that only guarantees that the
equilibrium strategy of each agent is optimal with respect to
the equilibrium strategies of the other agents. For a detailed
discussion of these, of these, the reader is referred to [7].
A direct revelation mechanism corresponding to a social
choice function 5&/10 is a mechanism of the form %=
&4>(#	ff?*	+	ff?,-	ff5&/100 . That is, the strategy sets are the type
sets itself and the outcome rule .$&/10 is the social choice
function itself. A social choice function is said to be incen-
tive compatible in dominant strategies (or strategy proof or
truthfully implementable in dominant strategies) if the direct
revelation mechanism % implements 5&/10 in a weakly dominant
strategy equilibrium where the equilibrium strategy of each
agent is to report its true type. Similarly a social choice
function is said to be Bayesian Nash incentive compatible
if the direct revelation mechanism % implements 5&/10 in a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the equilibrium strategy of
each agent is to report its true type. The revelation principle
[7] states that if a social choice function can be implemented
in dominant strategies (or in Bayesian Nash equilibrium), it
can also be truthfully implemented in dominant strategies
(or in Bayesian Nash equilibrium). The revelation principle
enables one to focus attention only on incentive compatible
mechanisms.
The mechanism design problem is to come up with a
mechanism that implements a desirable social choice function.
Some desirable properties which are sought from a social
choice function and hence from the implementing mechanism
(and in the present case, from procurement auctions) are
described next [7], [41], [33].
C. Properties Desired from an Auction
We now present an intuitive discussion of properties that
an auction designer looks for while designing an auction
mechanism. For a detailed treatment of these, the reader is
referred to [7], [8].
Solution Equilibrium: The solution of a mechanism is in
equilibrium, if no agent wishes to change its bid, given the
information it has about other agents. Many types of equilibria
can be computed given the assumptions about the preferences
of agents (buyers and sellers), rationality, and information
availability. They include: Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium, weakly dominant strategy equilibrium.
Efciency: A general criterion for evaluating a mechanism
is Pareto efciency, meaning that no agent could improve its
allocation without making at least one other agent worse off.
Another metric of efficiency is allocative efciency which is
achieved when the total utility of all the winners is maximized.
When allocative efficiency is achieved, the resources or items
are allocated to the agents who value them most. These two
notions are closely related to each other; in fact, when the
utility functions take a special form (such as quasi-linear form
[7]), Pareto efficiency implies allocative efficiency.
Incentive Compatibility: A mechanism is said to be incen-
tive compatible if the agents optimize their expected utilities
by bidding their true valuations of the goods. Depending on
the equilibrium achieved by truthful bidding, an incentive
compatible mechanism is qualified as Bayesian Nash incentive
6compatible or dominant strategy incentive compatible. In the
latter case, the mechanism is said to be strategy proof . If a
mechanism is strategy proof, each agent’s decision depends
only on its local information and there is no need whatsoever
for the agent to model or compute the the strategies of the
other agents.
Individual Rationality: A mechanism is said to be individ-
ually rational (or is said to have voluntary participation prop-
erty) if its allocations do not make any agent worse off than
if the agent had not not participated in the mechanism. That
is, every agent gains a non-negative utility by participating in
the mechanism.
Budget Balance: A mechanism is said to be weakly budget
balanced if the sum of monetary transfers between the buyer
and the sellers is non-negative while it is said to be strongly
budget balanced if this sum is zero. In other words, budget
balance ensures that the mechanism or the auctioneer does
not make losses.
Revenue Maximization or Cost Minimization: In an auction
where a seller is auctioning a set of items, the seller would
like to maximize total revenue earned. On the other hand,
in a procurement auction, the buyer would like to procure
at minimum cost. Given the difficulty of finding equilibrium
strategies, designing cost minimizing or revenue maximizing
auctions is not easy.
Solution Stability: The solution of a mechanism is stable,
if there is no subset of agents that could have done better,
coming to an agreement outside the mechanism.
Low Transaction Costs: The buyer and sellers would like
to minimize the costs of participating in auctions. Delay in
concluding the auction is also a transaction cost.
Fairness: Winner determination algorithms, especially
those based on heuristics, could lead to different sets of
winners at different times. Since there could be multiple
optimal solutions, different sets of winners could be produced
by different algorithms. This creates a perception of unfairness
and can influence bidders’ willingness to participate in auc-
tions. Bidders who lose even though they could have won with
a different algorithm could end up feeling unfairly treated.
D. Design Space for Auction Mechanisms
Ideally, one would like to put in place an auction mechanism
that satisfies all the properties described above, while simul-
taneously achieving computational tractability. Unfortunately
this is not always possible, as shown by several landmark re-
sults in mechanism design theory which rule out the possibility
of mechanisms simultaneously satisfying certain combinations
of properties. Fortunately, there do exist certain other combi-
nations of properties which can be simultaneously satisfied.
We indicate below some of the important results germane to
the discussion on procurement mechanisms.
 Arrow [7] first pointed out the impossibility of imple-
menting a Pareto efficient social choice function unless it
is dictatorial (a dictatorial social choice function is a very
special type of social choice function that requires the
presence of a distinguished agent such that the function
always chooses a top ranked outcome of this agent). The
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [7] is also similar in spirit
to Arrow’s theorem. These impossibility results are in the
context of settings where the agents simply have ordinal
preferences over outcomes.
 However, when we are in quasilinear settings (where
the preferences may be captured by utility functions and
furthermore utilities are comparable across agents), it was
shown by Groves [42] and Clarke [43] that allocatively
efficient and strategy proof mechanisms are possible.
These mechanisms are are known by the name VCG
mechanisms. Clarke’s mechanisms are in fact a special
class of Groves mechanisms. The GVA (Generalized
Vickrey Auction) mechanism [44] is basically the Clarke
mechanism applied to the case of combinatorial auctions.
The famous Vickrey auction is a special case of the
Clarke mechanism applied to the case of auction of a
single indivisible item.
 The Groves mechanisms are in general not budget bal-
anced even in quasilinear settings. There are two useful
settings where they do satisfy budget balance.
– The first setting arises when the type information
of one of the agents is completely known or when
the agent does not have any preferences over the
allocations. In this setting, by defining monetary
transfers appropriately, we can achieve the strategy
proof property, allocative efficiency, and weak budget
balance. The GVA mechanism is an example of one
such situation. In fact, the GVA mechanism satisfies
four properties simultaneously: allocative efficiency,
individual rationality, weak budget balance, and strat-
egy proofness.
– The second setting arises when we settle for the
weaker notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as
opposed to the much stronger dominant strategy
equilibrium. In this setting, it was shown by Arrow
[45] and d’Aspremont and Gerard-Verat [46] that,
under quasi-linear preferences, it is possible to have a
mechanism (which is called the dAGVA mechanism)
that is allocatively efficient, Bayesian Nash incentive
compatible, and budget balanced.
 The positive result indicated in the second setting above
may not however be sustained when we insist on individ-
ual rationality. The Myerson-Satterthwaite [47] theorem
articulates this negative result: Even in the simplest of
trading situations such as in bilateral trade (a simple ex-
change setting), it is impossible to design a social choice
function or a mechanism that is incentive compatible,
allocatively efficient, budget balanced, and individually
rational.
 Myerson [48] showed that revenue maximization, individ-
ual rationality, and Bayesian incentive compatibility can
be achieved simultaneously if we sacrifice allocative effi-
ciency. However, this result is true only while auctioning
a single indivisible item.
For more details on these results, we refer the reader to
[41], [7], [49], [25], [30]. The above discussion gives an idea
of how the design space for auctions is constrained.
7Another key factor that constrains the design space further
is the computational complexity at the agent level and at
the mechanism level. The central problem of a procurement
auction designer is to devise the best possible mechanism
that is contained in this constrained design space and that is
computationally tractable.
E. Computational Complexity Issues in Auction Design
In an economic mechanism where resource allocation is
based on decentralized information, computations are involved
at two levels: first, at the agent level and secondly at the mech-
anism level. The complexity questions involved are briefly
indicated below. For a more detailed discussion refer to [41],
[30].
Complexity at the Agent Level:
 Strategic Complexity: Should agents model other agents
and solve game theoretic problems to compute an opti-
mal strategy? For instance, in a sealed bid procurement
contract scenario, sellers will need to not only take their
valuation of the contracts into consideration but also
the bidding behavior of their competitors. This requires
sophisticated bidding capability.
 Valuation Complexity: How much computation is required
to provide preference information within a mechanism?
For instance, in a multi-item procurement scenario where
the items exhibit cost complementarities, estimating a bid
for every possible permutation of the bundle of items is
costly.
Complexity at the Mechanism Level:
 Winner Determination Complexity: How much compu-
tation is expected of the mechanism infrastructure to
compute the winning agents given the bid information of
the agents. It turns out in many common auction problems
that the winner determination problem is NP-hard [41],
[30], [31].
 Payment Determination Complexity: How much payment
do the winners of an auction make or receive? In many
situations, determining the price or payment also turns
out to be an NP-hard problem [41], [30].
 Communication Complexity: How much communication
is required between agents and the mechanism to compute
an outcome. For instance, in an English auction, where
individual valuations are revealed progressively in an
iterative manner, the communication costs could be high
if the auction were conducted in a distributed manner
over space and/or time.
The point to be noted is that even if we are able to design a
mechanism that satisfies many desired properties, the computa-
tional complexity at the mechanism level and at the agent level
may prohibit the use of this mechanism. An example here is
that of GVA applied to multi-item procurement auctions. GVA
satisfies allocative efficiency, weak budget balance, strategy
proofness, and individual rationality. However, the winner
determination problem turns out to be a set covering problem
which is NP-hard. The payment determination problem is also
a set covering problem. In fact, the payment determination
problem is to be solved for each winner separately!
F. Relevance of Game Theory and Incentive Issues in E-
Procurement
It may appear, at first glance, that there is a disconnect
between game theory and mechanism design on the one hand
and actual, real-world procurement negotiations on the other.
In our opinion, such an interpretation would be specious and
misleading for the following reasons.
 Firstly, procurement professionals are acutely aware of
the information asymmetry that exists in negotiations and
as a result the need to bargain hard. The analysis carried
out by procurement professionals before such bargain-
ing often implicitly involves game theoretic reasoning.
Witness is provided by the plethora of auction formats
that procurement professionals employ in practice. A
formal game theoretic analysis only helps to place such
reasoning on a firm basis. In the absence of sound game
theoretic analysis, naive auction strategies may actually
result in disastrous consequences. For evidence of this
we point the reader to a discussion of spectrum auctions
[28].
 Secondly, often it is argued that human agents fail to
measure up to the strict requirements of the fundamental
assumptions of rationality and intelligence that game
theory makes. Hence the inapplicability of game theoretic
analysis. However if we extrapolate the vector of develop-
ment in this area of application and assume that at some
point in the not too distant future, automated negotiations
carried out by software agents will become a reality then
a game theoretic analysis would be eminently applicable
before such systems are designed and built [44].
In summary, game theoretic considerations are already used
implicitly in procurement situations. Providing appropriate
incentives to the suppliers is an immediate example of ap-
plication of game theoretic analysis. Therefore, sound use of
game theoretic principles explicitly in designing automated
procurement mechanisms will enhance the efficacy of e-
procurement. This provides a compelling motivation for using
auction based mechanisms for e-procurement.
III. SINGLE ITEM PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
We discuss here models related to the procurement of a
single item with price as the only consideration for deci-
sion making under a variety of different business contexts.
Specifically, we review: (a) auction mechanisms for a single
unit of an item, (b) auctions for multiple units of a single
item with volume discount bids, and (c) auction mechanisms
for procuring multiple units of a single item for multiple
manufacturing points taking logistics costs into account.
A. Procurement Auctions for Single Unit of an Item
In many procurement scenarios for a single unit of an item,
the English auction or a sealed bid tender process is generally
used to decide the winner of the contract. In the later case the
winning rule is generally a first price rule. The second price
auction is rarely used because bidders feel that the information
may be used to the unfair advantage of the buyer. However,
8in Internet based buying, where anonymity of buyers and
sellers and non disclosure of prices may be assured, the second
price auction may yet be gainfully employed. While, we have
seen from the revenue equivalence theorem, that the expected
revenues from all the basic auctions may be the same, there
are significantly different implications when the auctions are
to be automated. We summarize the differences below.
1) Computational Implications of the four Basic Auction
Mechanisms: As indicated in the previous section, complexity
can be analyzed at the level of the agent - strategic and valua-
tion complexities, and the mechanism - winner determination
and communication complexities.
Strategic Complexity: Clearly for an agent participating in
a Vickrey auction, which is incentive compatible, the strategic
complexity is reduced to just bidding one’s true valuation
without any consideration for the strategies that would be
followed by other agents. However, agents in the Dutch and
first price sealed bid auctions require to base their bids not
only on their private valuations but also condition them on
the valuations of their competitors. This requires them to
process additional information - the number of competitors,
the probability distributions of their valuations, etc. which
increases their computational overhead. The English auction
has certain benefits relative to the Dutch and First Price
Sealed auctions. In an English auction, if all bidders bid up to
their true valuations, no single bidder can gain by unilaterally
deviating from this truthful strategy.
Communication Complexity: The communication overhead,
and hence the processing overhead, is clearly much higher in
multi round mechanisms like the English and Dutch auctions
as compared to single shot mechanisms such as the Vickrey
and first price sealed bid mechanisms.
B. Volume Discount Auctions
In a procurement context when a single buyer and multiple
sellers who wish to exploit scale economies are present, a
volume discount auction is appropriate. Here suppliers provide
bids as a function of the quantity that is being purchased
[19], [50]. The winner determination problem for this type of
auction mechanism is to select a set of winning bids, where
for each bid we select a price and quantity so that the total
demand of the buyer is satisfied at minimum cost.
The winner determination here is fairly straightforward if
there are no business constraints such as maximum/minimum
number of units that are to be purchased from a supplier,
minimum/maximum number of winning suppliers, etc. The
computational problem is to simply find the supplier who
offers the best price and buy the entire quantity from this
seller. However, procurement problems in practice rarely are
without business constraints. See [51] for a comprehensive
tabulation of business constraints that are observed in practice.
With inclusion of business constraints, the winner determina-
tion problem becomes a mixed integer programming problem
(MIP) [19], [52]. In the following subsection, we first present
the mathematical formulation of a volume discount auction
problem adapted from [50], [52] and then discuss the compu-
tational issues that arise in determining the winning bids.
TABLE I
NOTATION FOR VOLUME DISCOUNT AUCTIONS
@
quantity of item
A
number of suppliers
B
index for the suppliers (
BDCFEGH/HflH/G A
)
I J
supply curve (bid) from supplier
B
K J
number of price-quantity pairs in bid
I J
L
index for price-quantity pairs,
L CMEG/HflH/H/G KNJ
OJQP
unit price the supplier
B
charges if the number of units
bought from this supplier is within
the
LRTS
interval U
@ JQPflV W XY G4@ JQPflV
SZ\[ffS]
^
JQP
decision variable that takes value 1 if the buyer
buys a quantity in the range U
@
JQPflV W XY
G4@
JQPflV
SZ_[S ]
`
JQP
a continuous variable that specifies the exact number
of units bought
1) Mathematical formulation of volume discount auctions:
Table I provides the notation for the volume discount procure-
ment auction model presented below. [50], [52].
 The buyer needs to procure a quantity a of an item.
 The buyer identifies a list of potential suppliers bc
	+	d who can bid in the auction.
 Each supplier responds with a bid composed of a supply
curve. A supply curve from supplier b given by a
bid ef consists of a list of gf price quantity pairs,
h&9if()	j akf(l monpq	ffakf(l r
os
rtT0+	+	&'iufvxw	j akf+v?w7l monflpq	
ayf+vxw#l r
_s
r)t' . Each price quantity pair
&'iufz	j akfflzl monpq	ffakfflzfll r
os
r)t:0 specifies the price ifflz
that the supplier charges per unit of the item if the
number of units bought from this supplier is within
the interval j a fflzl monflp 	ffa fflzl r os r t . It is assumed that the
quantity intervals for the supply curve are all pairwise
disjoint. Also, note that different unit prices are used
for different ranges within the overall quantity a fflz
(that is, if a quantity spans multiple intervals, the unit
price for different spanned intervals will be taken as the
designated unit prices in the intervals).
The MIP formulation is as follows:
 A decision variable {$fflz is associated with each price-
quantity pair &9ifflz|	j akfflzfll m}npq	ayfflzfll r os rt:0 for each bid ef .
This is a ~ variable taking on the value 1 if we
buy some number of units within the price range and
0 otherwise.
 A continuous variable )fflz is associated with each price-
quantity pair, which specifies the exact number of units
of the item that are purchased from the bid  f within this
price-quantity pair.
The formulation is (see Table I):
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In the formulation provided by [50], it is assumed that 
types of items are being bought, which is a more generalized
problem. However even with a single item, the MIP formula-
tion is NP-hard. Additional side constraints such as a limit on
the number of winning suppliers and quantity constraints at the
level of the supplier increase the complexity of the decision
problem.
2) Computational Issues: The model is developed to ad-
dress the winner determination problem with the implicit
assumption that agents participating in the auction have a
bidding strategy in place, perhaps with the use of game
theoretic analysis. This being the context, we restrict our
attention to computational issues that arise at the mechanism
level and neglect analysis of any computational issues at the
agent (bidder) level. The MIP formulation in the previous
section is a variation of the multiple choice knapsack problem
which is 2i -Hard. Although Knapsack Problems, from a
theoretical point of view, are almost intractable as they belong
to the family of Fi -hard problems, several of the problems
may be solved to optimality in fractions of a second [53] and
can be considered as the simplest among 2i -Hard problems
in combinatorial optimization. This is because the knapsack
problem exhibits special structural properties which makes it
easy to solve. Dynamic programming techniques, branch-and-
bound algorithms and polynomial time approximation schemes
have been proposed to solve knapsack problems. For a detailed
exposition of several of these methods refer to [53]. Kamesh-
waran [54] shows that multi-unit procurement with volume
discount bids leads to piecewise linear knapsack problems and
proposes a variety of exact and heuristic techniques to solve
this class of problems.
C. Single Item, Multi-Unit Procurement to Minimize Total
Cost of Procurement (Supply Chain Auction)
In the previous subsections, we examined auction mecha-
nisms in automating supplier selection situations which co-
incide with a fairly operational view of procurement. When
the supplier selection process within a supply chain setting is
viewed, at a higher level of granularity, through a strategic
lens, a procurement manager is concerned with a larger set of
issues: What is the impact of a sourcing decision on the total
cost of procurement? How does one structure the sourcing pool
so that the total cost of procurement is minimized? A partial
list of important cost components that contribute to the total
cost of procurement could include: price per unit, logistics
cost, inventory holding costs, and lead time costs. Classical
auction literature, however, has focused on price and ignored
the impact of other costs on the sourcing decision.
A first step in incorporating these other cost components
while making a strategic sourcing decision is taken by Chen,
Janakiraman, Roundy, and Zhang [55]. They provide the de-
sign of single item, multi-unit auction mechanisms that achieve
overall supply chain efficiency while taking into account
production and transportation costs. The concern is to bring
together the business requirements within a global supply
chain, economic/game theoretic desiderata, and computational
issues in building the decision model. We call this the supply
chain auction.
The procurement problem addressed is as follows: A buyer
has requirements, called consumption quantities, for a certain
component at a set of geographically diverse locations. It is
assumed that the buyer has private valuations of consumption
quantities at the demand locations, which forms the consump-
tion vector and that she will act strategically to maximize her
utility. Multiple suppliers, each owning a set of production
facilities, are available to satisfy this demand. Every supplier
has a production cost, which can be described by a convex
function of the quantities that he produces at his production
locations. It is also assumed that each supplier is a rational,
self interested player who is trying to maximize his payoff
(payment received minus the production cost). In addition the
buyer knows the per unit transportation cost along each link
in the supply network and she pays for all shipments along
the links.
A key requirement in such resource allocation problems
is to ensure that the allocation is efficient, in the sense that
contracts are allocated to suppliers who provide the best value.
To do this the buyer needs to know the true production
costs of the suppliers. So, efficient allocation and incentive
compatibility are two of the key desiderata. There are three key
mechanisms for multi unit auctions: Pay-as-you-bid, uniform-
price, and VCG auctions. From auction literature, it is known
that VCG based mechanisms are both incentive compatible
and efficient. The auction models presented below for supply
chain procurement essentially invoke the VCG structure.
1) Model Formulation: Chen, Janakiraman, Roundy, and
Zhang [55] present three separate auction mechanisms - Auc-
tion T, Auction R, and Auction S. The first two mechanisms
incorporate transportation costs explicitly whereas in the third
model, only production costs are considered for the allocation
decision and transportation decisions are made subsequently.
This provides a means to compare the two approaches and the
implications for total cost of procurement strategies. Table II
provides the notation for the models introduced below.
2) Auction T: In this auction mechanism, the buyer submits
a fixed consumption vector q to the auctioneer. Supplier k
submits to the auctioneer a bid function ¡ f &:¢ f 0 for supplying
¢
f units, for which he incurs a production cost  f &:¢ f 0 , ¢ f 
£F¤ ¥
w
¤
. The supplier may or may not see the consumption
vector.
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TABLE II
NOTATION FOR AUCTION T, AUCTION R AND AUCTION S
A
number of suppliers
B
index for suppliers,
BDCMEG/HH/HflG A
¦
total number of supplier production facilities
§ index for production facilities, §
CFEGflH/H/HG ¦
K
total number of buyer locations
¨ index for buyer locations, ¨
CMEG/HHHG K
¦
J
set of production facilities owned by supplier k
B7©
index for supplier that owns production facility n
ªfl« consumption at demand center m, ª«­¬;®
^
© production quantity at production facility n
¯
J
vector of size °
¦
J
°
±
©
« quantity shipped from the production facility
§ to demand center ¨
²
©
« cost of transporting unit quantity from
production facility § to demand center ¨
`
J
« ³
©)´#µ
w
±
©
« , total quantity shipped to
demand center ¨ by supplier
B
¶ J)·
¯
J7¸
production cost function for supplier
B
( ¹>º
µ
w
º7»¹ )
¼ J ·
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bidding function from supplier
B
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º
µ
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The auctioneer decides the quantities awarded to each sup-
plier, and the amounts transported from suppliers’ production
centers to buyer’s demand locations by solving the following
winner determination problem.
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A Vickrey based payment rule, belonging to the more
general truth-inducing VCG family described in [56], is used.
The rule, in words, essentially is:
Payment to = Bonus payment on + Bid of
vendor b account of the value vendor b
that the vendor b adds
to the system by
participating in the
auction.
That is, if É &9Ê0 is the optimal value of the objective function
for a given q; ËÌÍ7ÊÏÎ;ÊÑÐÓÒ!	É &'Ê0ÔÖÕ× and we
restrict ÊF­Ë to ensure sufficient supply capacity. If &:¢ Ø	Ù!Øq0
is an optimal solution, and É -f &'Ê0 is the optimal value of
the objective function with the additional constraint that the
supplier k does not participate in the auction ( ¢ f Ú~ ), the
buyer will pay supplier b :
ÛÝÜ
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While it is true that the payment rule induces rational
suppliers to bid their true costs, ¡ f &:¢ f 0 =  f &:¢ f 0 , irrespective
of other suppliers’ bids, it also results in adverse effects for the
buyer. In situations where the production capacity is tight, and
the production costs are sharply convex, the contribution that a
supplier makes to the system can be significantly high resulting
in disproportionately high payments even when production is
at a low cost. Alternately, as pointed out by the authors, when
suppliers’ capacities are asymmetric, removing a supplier to
solve the optimization problem may result in computing an
infinite value for the contribution that is made, which is
an undesirable consequence. To rectify these problems, the
authors propose Auction R.
3) Auction R: In this auction mechanism, the winner
determination (optimization) problem solved by the auctioneer
retains the essential structure of Auction T except that the
payment rule is modified. This modification results in much
lower payments, compared to Auction T, by the buyer while
simultaneously ensuring that the sellers bid their true costs. In
essence, incentive compatibility is retained.
The key idea introduced to achieve this result is as follows:
Here, the buyer submits a utility function àá&'Ê0 , which is a
proxy for the true consumption utility âã&9Ê0 , in place of a
consumption vector as in Auction T. The auctioneer solves
a modified version of the winner determination (optimization)
problem using a new payment rule. This rule follows the VCG
payment structure but also incorporates the utility function
àá&9Ê0 in computing the payments. The utility function es-
sentially serves the role of a reservation price function for
each unit of the item that the buyer might acquire. While in
most auctions the payment made to a supplier is based on
bids from all suppliers, in Auction R, part of the payment is
determined by the proxy utility function acting as a reservation
price function. This prevents unusually large payments.
There is however a price to pay for this improvement.
In order to submit an optimal utility function àä6)&'Ê0 , the
buyer needs to know the suppliers’ production cost functions.
However this may not hold in reality. So the buyer will have
to expend effort to at least get a probabilistic belief of the
cost functions. This causes uncertainty in both payments and
consumption quantities. Numerical examples to illustrate this
effect are provided in [55].
4) Auction S: In order to compare the cost savings, if any,
that could be achieved by taking an integrated view of sourcing
decisions, the authors formulate Auction S. Here the buyer’s
sourcing decision is based only upon the bids submitted
by the sellers, and the transportation costs are determined
subsequently.
The buyer submits a consumption vector q as in Auction
T. The auctioneer solves two optimization problems, one to
determine allocation and payments and the other to optimize
transportation costs, separately.
Winner Determination Problem:
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If É-å!&'Ê0 is the optimal objective value, ¢ å the production
vector, and É $f
å
&9Ê0 the optimal objective value without sup-
plier b , the buyer’s payment to supplier k is given by the rule:
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We can observe that this payment rule still retains the
VCG structure, and hence the suppliers will submit their
true cost functions. Subsequently the transportation costs are
determined by solving the following optimization problem:
Transportation Problem:
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The buyers total outflow, ê-å &9Ê0 , is given by êçå!&'Ê0ë
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½ . The numerical exper-
iments clearly show that Auction S minimizes total production
costs but leads to higher supply chain costs than Auctions T
and R.
5) Computational issues: The crucial contribution of this
model has been to take an integrated view of the sourcing prob-
lem by combining the pricing and the transportation decisions.
The mechanism incorporates game theoretic considerations in
supply chain formations when products are sourced globally
for demand points that are distributed geographically. Since the
mechanism is incentive compatible for the suppliers, the com-
plexity of evolving an optimal bid strategy is simply reduced to
reporting the actual production costs, thereby eliminating the
need for complex modeling of competitors’ behavior. At the
mechanism level however, &'dãî0 optimization problems need
to be solved to decide the allocations and payments. Further,
since the mechanism is not incentive compatible for the buyer,
the buying agent needs to solve an optimization problem
to decide an optimal bidding strategy. Such an optimization
problem is known to be challenging and hence a numerical
approach may be warranted.
Also, from the analysis presented in this paper, it is clear
that in designing auction mechanisms for complex supply
chains, focus on truth revealing auction mechanisms is to be
augmented by pragmatic considerations of limiting the total
payout of the buyers. This can be achieved by using the idea
of a reservation price suitably expressed as a utility function.
D. Summary and Current Art
In this section, we reviewed models proposed to handle the
procurement of both single unit and multiple units of a single
item, with a single attribute - price as the criterion for decision
making. In the first model (III.A), we illustrated the game
theoretic considerations that influence the bidding behavior
of agents. In the second model (III.B), in the absence of
game theoretic requirements, we pointed out the computational
complexity of the winner determination problem in a more
complex sourcing situation. The third model (III.C) brought
together the game theoretic as well as computational issues
that complicate the sourcing problem. This was done to
illustrate the fact that in the absence of proper mechanism
design, the buyer could end up leaving money on the table.
We now briefly describe some recent work in this area. A
successful case study of multi-unit procurement with volume
discount bids is reported in [19]. The computational challenges
involved in the winner determination problem there are de-
scribed in [52], [50]. Kameshwaran [54], in his recent work,
has shown that single item, single attribute, multi-unit pro-
curement with volume discount bids leads to piecewise linear
knapsack problems to be solved. In his work, Kameshwaran
has developed several algorithms (exact, heuristic-based, and
fully polynomial time approximation schemes) for solving
such knapsack problems.
Kothari, Parkes, and Suri [65] consider single-item, single
attribute, multi-unit procurement auctions where the bidders
use marginal-decreasing, piecewise constant functions to bid
for goods. The objective is to minimize cost for the buyer.
It is shown that the winner determination problem is a gen-
eralization of the classical 0/1 knapsack problem, and hence
NP-hard. Computing VCG payments is also addressed. The
authors provide a fully polynomial time approximation scheme
(FPTAS) for the generalized knapsack problem. This leads
to an FPTAS algorithm for allocation in the auction which
is approximately strategy proof and approximately efficient
[65]. It is also shown that VCG payments for the auctions can
be computed in worst-case ï&:ðñoòóÞ!0 time, where ð is the
running time to compute a solution to the allocation problem.
Dang and Jennings [64] consider multi-unit auctions where
the bids are piece-wise linear curves. Algorithms are provided
for solving the winner determination problem. In the case of
multi-unit, single-item auctions, the complexity of the clearing
algorithm is ï&: &42Áî0
,
0 where  is the number of bidders
and  is an upper bound on the number of segments of
the piecewise linear pricing functions. The clearing algorithm
therefore has exponential complexity in the number of bids.
To summarize, the two main issues in single item, multi-
unit, single attribute auctions are (1) to reduce the complexity
of the winner determination problem and (2) to make the
mechanism strategy proof. Table III provides an appropriate
taxonomy for this type of auctions and gives a listing of
relevant papers under the various categories.
IV. MULTI-ITEM PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
In the preceding section, we reviewed mechanisms that
support single item procurement. In one of the mechanisms,
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Basic Auction Types [5], [24], [48], [57] [58], [16], [12], [13] [26], [27], [28], [59]
[60], [61] [14], [15], [3], [4] [30], [29], [25]
[24], [9], [39]
Volume Discount Auction [54], [62], [62] [63], [19], [64], [65] [19]
Supply Chain Auction [55], [66]
TABLE III
CLASSIFICATION OF SINGLE ITEM, SINGLE ATTRIBUTE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
we discussed the inclusion of logistics costs as an additional
element influencing the procurement decision. Clearly such
supply chain criteria are of crucial importance to procurement
managers responsible for large global supply chains. Typically
purchase requests within such large purchasing organizations
provide opportunities to exploit complementarities in logistics
costs and often in production costs too. For instance, in one
of the negotiation scenarios depicted in Section II.A, a family
of cutting tools may be procured by a series of sequential
reverse auctions, one for each of the items. This has at least
two consequences: Firstly, the price that a supplier may be
willing to offer may depend in complicated ways on what
other items he wins, and since there is uncertainty associated
with this, the suppliers have no incentive to bid aggressively.
Secondly, the suppliers do not have an opportunity to express
their unique complementarities in production costs and hence
the buyer cannot exploit the economies of scope associated
with bundling the demands. In such cases it may be beneficial
to allow the suppliers to bid on combinations of items rather
than on single items. Such auctions are called combinatorial
auctions.
Simply defined, a combinatorial auction (CA) is a mecha-
nism where bidders can submit bids on combinations of items.
The winner determination problem is to select a winning set
of bids such that each item to be bought is included in at least
one of the selected bids, and the total cost of procurement is
minimized. In this section we first present the crucial issues
that arise when CAs are applied to procurement settings. We
then review approaches to modeling multi-item procurement
in supply chain settings which take business and capacity level
constraints into consideration.
A. Issues in Multi-Item Procurement
Important issues in combinatorial auctions are well surveyed
in [31], [33], [18], [38], [34]. In the multi-item procurement
case, when suppliers are allowed to respond with combi-
natorial bids, the winner determination problem becomes a
weighted set covering problem, which is known to be NP-hard.
In addition, since the bidders can submit bids on combinations
of items, the representation of the bid is also a crucial
implementation issue. Bidding language issues are discussed
in [67], [68].
As opposed to single item procurement scenarios, in multi-
item procurement scenarios, the range of issues to be consid-
ered is vastly expanded because practical business level issues
and constraints need to be included in the decision model.
TABLE IV
NOTATION FOR COMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT
¦
total number of items to be procured
ô
index for items,
ô CMEG/HflH/H/G ¦
õ
Z
number of units of item
ô
demanded
A
number of suppliers
B
index for suppliers,
BDCMEGHH/HG A
K
maximum number of bids allowed for any supplier
L
index for a bid,
L CMEG/HH/HG K
I
J4P
bid
L
of supplier
B
ö
Z
JQP 0-1 variable which takes value 1 iff
IuJQP
will supply the entire lot corresponding to item
ô
÷
JQP
price associated with bid
IuJQP
ø
JV
«
Z
© minimum quantity that should be allocated to supplier
B
øyJV
«uùú maximum quantity that can be allocated to supplier
B
^
JQP
decision variable that takes value 1 iff
I
JQP
is allocated
±
J
indicator variable that takes value 1 iff
supplier
B
is allocated any lot
û
«
Z
© minimum number of winners required
û
« ùú maximum number of winners allowed
These could include exclusion constraints (for example, item A
cannot be procured from supplier X), aggregation constraints
(for example, at least two and at most five suppliers need
to be selected for goods of category B), and exposure con-
straints (for example, not more than 25% of the procurement
value should be assigned to any one supplier) [69], [19]. By
including these constraints in the decision model, a sensitivity
analysis of side constraints may also prove to be a useful
tactical input to procurement planners.
B. A Single Round Combinatorial Procurement Mechanism
As indicated above, the reverse combinatorial auction prob-
lem is a set covering problem, which is NP-hard. Additional
side constraints make a fundamental impact on the problem.
Even finding a feasible solution when exposure constraints are
in place is NP-hard. The basic formulation of the problem and
the additional side constraints are presented below and solution
techniques are discussed thereafter. The following formulation
is from [50], [19]. Table IV provides the notation.
1) Mathematical Formulation: For each item type Á
	+	fl there is a demand ü  . Each supplier bìd is allowed
up to g bids indexed by  . Associated with each bid ekfflz is
a zero-one vector ý 
fflz
, kþ	+	 where ý 
fflz
< if e fflz
will supply the entire lot corresponding to item  and zero
otherwise. Associated with each bid e fflz is price ß fflz at which
the bidder is willing to supply the combination of items in the
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bid. A mixed integer programming (MIP) formulation can be
written as follows:
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àßfîl
½

, and àßfîl ½ are the minimum and maximum
quantities that can be allocated to any supplier b . Constraints
(21) and (22) restrict the total allocation to any supplier to
lie within &4àßfîl ½  ,!	àßfîl ½ 0 . ¿ f is an indicator variable that
takes the value 1 if supplier b is allocated any lot.  ½  , and

½ are respectively the minimum and maximum number of
winners required for the allocation and constraint (24) restricts
the winners to be within that range.
2) Solution Approach and Discussion: Although the deci-
sion model is NP-hard, integer programming techniques are
known to be effective in solving problems with 500 items and
up to 5000 bids [19]. For the purpose of this paper, the authors
use IBM’s OSL (Optimization Solutions and Library) to solve
the IP formulation. From the experiments that were conducted,
the following conclusions could be derived:
 Firstly, varying the aggregation constraint seems to have a
large impact on the computation time. This is because, as
we commented earlier, the problem of finding a feasible
solution itself is NP-complete.
 Secondly, the min-max exposure constraints also have
a significant effect on the computational time. In some
sense, the exposure constraint could itself be a proxy for
the aggregation constraint and hence the behavior appears
similar.
C. An Iterative Reverse Dutch Auction for Combinatorial
Procurement
In the previous section, we discussed a purely computational
view of the multi-item procurement problem without looking
at economic desiderata. It is however important for a variety of
reasons to lend credence to economic issues in the modeling
and analysis of multi-item procurement. Firstly, we would like
to ensure that procurement contracts are allocated to those
that value them most. In the absence of economic analysis,
the game is open for suppliers to indulge in strategic bidding
behavior in an effort to extract the maximum possible surplus
utility from the transaction. This is especially true when single
shot mechanisms are used. Secondly, even if multi-round
combinatorial auctions are used where allocation and pricing
information is disclosed at the end of each round, it is not
clear to suppliers as to how they need to reformulate their
bids. The two issues together may prompt wasteful usage of
resources by each supplier in trying to outsmart the buyer and
other suppliers. One way to amend the situation is to design
an incentive compatible mechanism.
Generalized Vickrey Auctions (GVA) generalize the single
item second price auction (Vickrey auction) proposed in [40].
This is an incentive compatible mechanism for combinatorial
auctions, which can be applied to the procurement context
[70]. However, one issue that needs to be considered is that
the GVA requires an optimal solution to the allocation problem
which is NP-hard. In the absence of an optimal solution to the
allocation problem, the resulting mechanism, whose allocation
is obtained through some approximation scheme, is no longer
incentive compatible [56]. However, iterative algorithms for
combinatorial auction problems have been proposed by [71]
and [72] which try to resolve the tension between economic
and computational efficiencies. In a similar vein, Biswas and
Narahari [70] have proposed an iterative reverse Dutch auction
scheme for combinatorial procurement auctions which we
discuss next.
1) Integer Programming Formulation for the Reverse Dutch
Auction: The basic idea behind this approach is to formulate
the procurement problem as a weighted set covering problem
and use the Dutch auction format to develop an iterative
solution scheme. This approach reduces the computational
complexity by breaking up one large GVA into several smaller
GVAs. The iterative algorithm itself is motivated by [73],
and involves a two step process: (1) progressively increasing
the average reserve price of the items in each round, and
(2) allocating items for which bids satisfy the reserve price.
Classical (forward) Dutch auctions are decreasing auctions
which have been typically used for multi-unit homogeneous
items. In the single unit Dutch auction the auctioneer begins
at a high price and incrementally lowers it until some bidder
signals acceptance. Similarly in the multi-unit case the price is
incrementally reduced till all the items are sold or the seller’s
reserve price is reached.
In the reverse auction for procurement the buyer has a
procurement budget and tries to procure a bundle of items
at minimal cost not exceeding the procurement budget. She
starts with a low initial willingness to pay (say equal to zero)
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and keeps on increasing the willingness to pay until the total
bundle is procured or the budget limit is reached. This total
budget cannot be divided linearly into budget for each item
because of the complementarities involved.
The iterative mechanism proposed in [70], [74] consists of
multiple bidding rounds denoted by   Å~í			 (  Á~ is the
initial round). The buyer sets àá&9e0 , maximum willingness
to pay for the remaining bundle e to be procured in round
  . The pricing of items is not linear, therefore the cost of the
allocated bundles cannot be divided into price of individual
items. Therefore we compute ß  , the average willingness of
the buyer to pay for each item in round   .
ß  
àá&9e0

e 

	
	ée  (25)
The payment made by the buyer for the subset  in iteration
  is 6&'  0 . The average price paid by the buyer for each item
procured is   ffflfi
åffi! 
¤
å
ffi
¤
. Iterations in which no items are
procured are ignored.
The reserve price of the seller for any bundle  in iteration
  is




$( . The bundle procured in round   is denoted by " .
Therefore the integer programming formulation of the GVA
problem with reserve prices in iteration   becomes
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The notation for the Iterative Reverse Dutch Auction
(IRDA) algorithm is provided in Table V.
The IRDA Algorithm: As opposed to a naive approach, the
IRDA algorithm relies on choosing an increment in each round
such that it is based on the size of the bundle to be procured.
1) Suppose the buyer’s initial willingness to pay for the
entire bundle e1 is zero i.e. àá&'e1î0 Á~ . Therefore the
willingness to pay for each item is also zero i.e. ß 1 Á~ .
Since no seller is likely to be interested in bidding at
this price we have

6
&4%17021Å ~
2) Increment the average willingness to pay for each item
by 3 to ß-(4 1 53 . This actually means that the
buyer’s willingness to pay for the bundle e ( is changed
to àá&'e ( 0

e
(
6
ß
( . We assume that the increment
3 in every iteration is constant. The reserve price of any
bundle  for the sellers becomes



1 .
TABLE V
NOTATION FOR ITERATIVE REVERSE DUTCH AUCTION ALGORITHM
7
set of items to be procured
ô
index for an item to be procured,
ô*8 7
û
a subset of items,
û:9;7
A
total number of suppliers
B
index for suppliers,
BqCMEGHH/H/G A
<
iteration number
I
R bundle remaining to be procured in iteration
<
· û
R
¸
set procured in iteration
<
=?>· û
R
¸
buying price of the set
û
R in iteration
<
@
R average buying price of each item in iteration
<
÷
R average price set by the auctioneer in iteration
<
ø·TI
R
¸
maximum price set by the auctioneer for the bundle
I
R in iteration
<
@
J ·
û ¸
valuation of set
û
to seller
B
±
· ûfiG4B ¸
indicator variable that takes value 1 iff
bundle
û 8 7
is allocated to agent
B
A increment in buyer’s willingness to pay
3) Solve the allocation problem if there are any bids i.e.,
for iteration  ß  solve Eq. 26 and calculate |( . This
is again a combinatorial optimization problem. But this
is much smaller than the complete problem.
4) Allocate the subsets to the winners. Remove the allo-
cated items from the set to be procured and increment
the average willingness to pay for each item to ß * 

(
B3 , i.e., the maximum willingness of the buyer to pay
for the remaining bundle e * is àá&9e * 03

e
*
)6
ß
* .
The new reserve price of any bundle  of items for the
sellers is




( .
5) Go to step C and repeat until the buyer can procure the
entire bundle or the upper limit i.e., the total procure-
ment budget is reached. In any iteration   the following
condition should be satisfied:
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This approach to the combinatorial procurement problem,
solves the problem of capturing cost complementarities. How-
ever, in typical strategic procurement settings capacity plan-
ning at suppliers is a crucial task meriting detailed attention if
supply lines are not to be disrupted. This planning of capacity
and allocation of contracts can be significantly difficult when
multiple contracts are to be established simultaneously. We
discuss this issue in the next subsection.
D. An Iterative Procurement Mechanism for Capacity Con-
strained Environments
In some strategic sourcing settings, where suppliers are
looked upon as extensions of the enterprise, it is imperative
to engage in prudent capacity management. Failure to do so
could result in production line disruptions and high overtime
costs. So when making multi-item procurement decisions, even
when the product attributes do not show complementarities in
costs, but share resources it is necessary to factor in capacity
planning at least at the aggregate levels. One recent effort
to incorporate this aspect into auction based procurement
mechanisms has been due to Gallien and Wein[66].
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TABLE VI
NOTATION FOR PROCUREMENT UNDER CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
¦
number of components (items) to be procured
ô
index for components,
ô CFEGH/HflH/G ¦
ª
Z number of units of component
ô
to be procured
A
number of suppliers
B
index for resources (suppliers),
BDCMEG/HflH/HG A
R
J
capacity of supplier
B
ö
J
Z amount of resource
B
required for component
ô
<
index that represents auction rounds
S J
Z
·
<
¸
bid submitted in round
<
by supplier
B
for any quantity between 0 and ª Z
^
J
Z
·
<
¸
decision variable for bid
S
J
Z
·
<
¸
The procurement scenario that they analyze is as follows
(see Table VI for notation): The buyer wants to procure À 
units of component ;|	+	 . There are d suppliers
willing to supply some or all of these quantities subject to
overall capacity constraints. Overall capacity constraints of
resource (supplier) b is Tf and the usage can be described
by a linear model where ý f  is the amount of resource b
required for component  . An auctioneer acts as an interme-
diary between the buyer and the seller thereby decoupling
the information between the two, much like what happens on
http://www.freemarkets.com/.
1) The Auction Mechanism: The mechanism is designed
as a multi round auction where in each round   the supplier
b submits a bid  f fl&U 0 to sell any quantity between 0 and
À of component  . Further non-reneging and minimum bid
decrement rules are in place. In each round of the auction
a potential allocation ¢ &V 0N<&9{-f  &U 0fl0
fXWZYff(ffl\[\[\[ l
^]
l

WZYff(l\[\[\[ l
¥
] is
obtained by solving the linear program given below.
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At the end of each round, the potential allocation ¢ffi&V 0 is
displayed to the supplier b which can be used to better the
bid in the following round. The supplier can choose to follow
a myopic best response (MBR) strategy embedded within a
software based bid suggestion device. To use this feature, the
supplier b is required to submit his actual production costs
f
 for component  to the auctioneer. The next bid _Ý6
f
&U í70
to be submitted by supplier b is such that he maximizes his
potential payoff `?ffi&V_D&V 0fl0?a ³
,

Ł

&'+f

&V 0+f

0{-f

&V 0 in round
  by carrying out a suitable computation [66].
E. Summary and Current Art
In this section we reviewed mechanisms designed to support
multi-item procurement scenarios. In the first part (V.B), we
discussed a purely computational approach to the procurement
decision problem to illustrate the computational problems that
arise. In the next section we introduced economic concerns and
discussed the limitations to achieving both computation and
economic efficiencies. Finally we discussed the implications
of capacity constraints at suppliers on decisions made through
combinatorial auction models. Also, we deliberated on one
approach to providing the suppliers with a bid suggestion de-
vice to help in reformulating bids in a complex combinatorial
environment.
Currently, combinatorial auctions constitute a very active
research area. There are several surveys that have appeared
on this topic, for example, see [31], [32], [33], [18], [34],
[41]. There is also a recent comprehensive book by Cramton,
Shoham, and Steinberg [35]. There have been numerous
efforts in solving the winner determination problems arising
in complex combinatorial auctions. The reader is referred
to the papers [79], [86], [87], [77], [75], [76], [78], [91],
[64]. Another topic of active research is design of truthful
combinatorial auctions. Please refer to [81], [85], [56], [32] for
more details. Design of iterative combinatorial auctions [82],
[83], [41], [84], [90], [74], [88], [89] is one more direction in
which a fair amount of research activity is in progress. Multi-
attribute combinatorial auctions, however, have received little
attention due to the intrinsic difficulties involved.
Table VII provides an appropriate taxonomy of combinato-
rial procurement auctions and gives a listing of relevant papers
under each category.
V. MULTI-ATTRIBUTE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
The procurement mechanisms of the two previous sections
involve a single attribute based on price. In practice, these
mechanisms address only a limited band of the negotiation
spectrum, whereas sourcing decisions involve multiple criteria
- both quantitative and qualitative [92]. Benyoucef, Ding, and
Xie [51] present an exhaustive, hierarchical list of criteria that
are used in evaluating and selecting suppliers. Incorporating
these criteria into an automated negotiation tool to support
sourcing decisions has been the holy grail of purchasing
professionals, industrial engineers, and computer scientists.
Many software solution vendors now support multi attribute
reverse auctions in their e-sourcing solutions. Weighted, multi-
parameter, multi-line item request-for-quotes (RFQs) and re-
verse auction capabilities are provided by Ariba, freemar-
kets, and Procuri; i2 Technologies goes one step further and
claims to support all these within an optimization module
that allows business level constraints to be incorporated [9].
Since these are commercial products, it is not possible to
independently verify the mechanics of the automated sourcing
solutions. However, we conjecture that they use one or more
of the known approaches to multiple criteria decision analysis
(MCDA) such as additive value models, analytic hierarchy
process (AHP), lexicographic ordering, multi-attribute util-
ity theory (MAUT), simple multi-attribute rating technique
(SMART), and traditional weight assessment. For a detailed
treatment of these approaches, we refer the reader to [93].
In this section, our discussion focuses on single item,
multi-attribute procurement problems to investigate (1) the
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Combinatorial Auction [75], [76], [77], [78], [79], [23], [18], [65], [80] [19], [17], [38], [11], [20]
[81], [82], [83], [41], [84] [70], [74], [85], [86], [21], [22], [31], [32]
[87], [88], [89], [64] [33], [34], [35], [23]
[90], [74], [88], [89]
Volume Discount Auction [63], [62], [54] [63], [62] [19]
TABLE VII
CLASSIFICATION OF MULTI-ITEM PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
problem scenarios addressed, (2) solution approaches, and (3)
computational and game theoretic issues.
A. Issues in Multi-Attribute Procurement
Simply defined, multi-attribute procurement refers to the
decision process related to the determination of a contract
by considering a variety of attributes involving not just price
but also aspects such as quality, delivery time, contract terms,
warranties, after sales service, etc. In practice, multi-attribute
procurement scenarios come in various hues and shades. To
aid in analysis, we group these problems into three distinct
categories which we believe adequately reflect the issues to be
considered from a computational / automation point of view.
The groups and their characteristics are:
 Multiple attributes are known a priori and are uncorre-
lated; individual attributes have point values. The suppli-
ers provide point bids where each bid has a single price
and each attribute has a single value, either provided by
the supplier or computed by the buyer.
 Multiple attributes are known a priori and are uncorre-
lated; each attribute can take an individual value from a
domain of possible values for the attribute. The suppliers
provide congurable bids which specify multiple values
and price markups for each attribute.
 The multiple attributes are not known a priori and they
are uncorrelated. The suppliers may provide point bids
or congurable bids. This is not unlike many negotiation
situations where the buyer has only a rough idea of her
requirements but relies on suppliers to educate him about
attributes relevant to the procurement decision.
A further level of complexity is involved when the attributes
are correlated in each of the above cases. Also, each of the
above scenarios can occur in combinations.
In the first scenario above, if we assume that there exists
some decision rule which, as a function of all the multiple at-
tributes, ranks the bids, then the winner determination problem
is relatively straightforward. In the latter two cases, however,
the options are combinatorial in nature and hence the winner
determination problem will have exponential complexity. This
raises the issue of compactness of information or bid repre-
sentation. We now focus on methods to develop the decision
rule for ranking of bids.
Traditional approaches to developing the decision rule have
relied on either a hierarchical elimination process or on
weighted average techniques. Since determining the hierar-
chy or the choice of weights is not always straightforward,
especially in the face of a large number of attributes, many
sophisticated approaches, including the use of optimization
tools, have been proposed which we review next.
1) Elimination Methods: In this method, at each level,
we eliminate from the bid list, bids that do not satisfy the
selection rule. The selection rule may be a conjunctive rule or
a lexicographic rule. In either case, a hierarchy of the attributes
needs to be established in the order of their importance, which
is fuzzy for most decision makers. To overcome this handicap,
optimization based approaches have been devised. We briefly
describe these techniques below:
Lexicographic Ordering: Here, on the first level, we select
the most significant criterion and we compare bids based on
this. If a bid satisfies this criterion much better than the other
suppliers, then it is chosen, otherwise the bids are compared
with respect to the second criterion, and so on.
Satiscing: In this technique we set minimum levels for
every attribute except one, which is the target attribute, such
as price. We select bids which satisfy the minimum levels and
choose the one with the optimal value of the target. It is also
possible to iterate through the minimum levels.
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP): This is an analytical
tool, supported by simple techniques, that enables people to
explicitly rank tangible and intangible factors against one
another for the purpose of resolving conflict or for setting
priorities. The process involves structuring a problem from
a primary objective (e.g. selecting the best bid) to secondary
levels of objectives (e.g. performance objectives, quality needs,
etc.). Once these hierarchies have been established, a pairwise
comparison matrix of each element within each level is con-
structed.
Goal Programming: This is a way to handle multiple
objectives in what would otherwise be a LP. The basic concept
is to set ”aspiration levels” (targets) for each objective and
prioritize them. One would then optimize the highest priority
objective with respect to the original (”hard”) constraints.
Next, a constraint is added saying that the first objective
function’s value must be at least as good as what was achieved
or the aspiration level, whichever is worse. Now the second
objective is optimized, turned into a constraint, etc.
2) Weighted Average Methods: The weighted average
methods essentially rely on the introduction of a virtual
currency which expresses the overall utility of a bid to the
buyer. The computation of the virtual currency is based upon
the utility function specified by the buyer and bids that achieve
the best overall utility are declared winners. It is obviously
of interest to the buyer to specify the best possible utility
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TABLE VIII
NOTATION FOR ORDINAL RANKING OF ALTERNATIVES
I
Set of Bids,
I C
 
Icb G/HflH/H/G Iffd

B
index for supplier bids (
BqCFEGHHH/G A
)
§ number of attributes
ô
index for attributes,
ô CFEGH/HflH/G
§
@
vector of attributes
^
Z
J level of attribute
ô
in bid
B
¯
J
vector of attributes of bid
IJ
e
Z
·
¯
Z
J
¸
utility function for attribute
ô
in bid
I J
û
J
score of Bid
I J
f
Z weight for attribute
ô
function. We briefly describe some of these techniques below:
Traditional weighted average technique: Purchasing pro-
fessionals have traditionally relied upon assigning weights to
individual attributes and using a simple additive rule to derive
the virtual currency. This is not dissimilar to approaches in
micro-economic theory for developing utility functions. This
has been further refined by the swing weighting approach
described in [94]. The application of this approach can be
severely restricting when the number of attributes to be con-
sidered is large.
Weight Determination Based on Ordinal Ranking of Alter-
natives (WORA): This approach recognizes the pitfalls in using
the weighted average technique and hence relies on linear
programming techniques to compute the optimal weights for
each of the attributes. We detail this approach in the next
section.
Inverse Optimization Methods: This technique is an im-
provement over WORA, in the sense that it does not rely on a
single central agency (the buyer) to provide inputs to compute
the optimal decision rule. Rather it uses a novel and intelligent
technique based on inverse optimization to gather information
distributed among various agents (sellers) in the marketplace
to develop the optimal scoring (decision) rule.
In the following sections, we emphasize two different ap-
proaches that have been proposed to develop multi attribute
procurement mechanisms.
B. Additive Value Model Based on Ordinal Ranking of Alter-
natives
A straightforward approach to multi-attribute procurement
is to assume that the utilities of each of the attributes are
additive in nature and hence a virtual currency, like the stock
market index can be developed. Formally, we have a vector a
of relevant attributes of a bid. We index the attributes by  and
the set of bids e á7e>(î		fle   by b . See Table VIII for
notation. A vector ¢ f  &:{ (
f
	+	fl{
,
f
0 is specified, where { 
f
is the level of the attribute  in bid f . In the simple case of
an additive utility function â&:¢ f0 , each attribute is evaluated
through a utility function â  &:¢ 
f
0 and the overall utility is the
sum of all weighted utilities. This produces a virtual currency
to be used in mechanisms of the type proposed for single
attributes. The crucial issue however is the following: How are
the weights or the utility function decided? Naive approaches
include the elicitation of buyers preferences through the design
of smart web forms [1]. More recently techniques based on
decision analysis have been proposed by [94] and [95] which
we describe next.
The WORA technique has been developed as part of an
application framework to provide buyer side decision support
for e-sourcing [94]. It is based on the realization that the
buyer can make deductions about the superiority of bids
through simple pairwise comparisons. By making many such
comparisons, not entirely exhaustive, it is possible to build
a larger information set to elicit intelligently the scoring
function. This is done in a two step process.
In the first step, sample ordinal rankings of bids are pro-
vided by the buyer. They are of the form e (hg e *ig
ej . These rankings are checked for intransitive preferences
and dominance violations. These sample rankings are then
transformed into constraints to a linear program, which then
generates estimates for the decision maker’s weights. The LP
is formulated as follows:
Let eÓ îe>(î	ex*		e   be a subset of bids that are
ranked in the order ek(
g
ex*
g
ej
g

g
e
 . The score
f of each bid e>f is computed as:
f>
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0 b (30)
where the weights k  are unknown and  is the number of the
attribute, and these satisfy the bid rankings. The LP is:
Maximize ~
subject to:
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A feasible solution to this LP can be found and results in a
set of weights to be used in the scoring rule. The authors also
provide some numerical experiments to show the efficacy of
the technique. These weights are then used within a standard
single attribute like procurement mechanism with the virtual
currency, obtained by combining price and all other attributes,
substituting for price.
While this technique is an improvement over ad-hoc weight
assignment models, it still relies on a single buying agent
to indicate an ordinal ranking in order to come up with
an optimal scoring function. This approach does nothing to
exploit the cost complementarities that production systems of
the suppliers may exhibit in providing certain attribute levels.
In such cases it may be beneficial for the buyer to understand
the nature of the suppliers’ cost functions in terms of the non-
price attributes. Understandably, it is not likely to be in the
interest of suppliers to part with this information. In the next
section we discuss one approach which tries to overcome this
problem.
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NOTATION FOR INVERSE OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES
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C. Additive Value Model with Inverse Optimization Techniques
In some procurement scenarios where the establishment of
a contract depends upon multiple attributes (price, quality,
delivery time, features and options, etc), a Request-for-Quote
(RFQ) process is preferred. In this process, the buyer an-
nounces a scoring rule in terms of the bid price and the various
attributes to be considered. It is not uncommon for the buyer
to change the scoring rule to reflect any new information that
has been gleaned during the RFQ/negotiation process. This
idea is formalized in the eRFQ mechanism in [95] which is
designed to address a procurement scenario with the following
characteristics and assumptions (see Table IX for notation):
 A single item with multiple attributes is to be procured.
The attributes are indexed by 		 ; k indexes the
d suppliers; and x>3		fli indexes the rounds of
the auction, where i is the number of cost (and utility)
parameters.
 Each bid submitted by a supplier is of the form
&\ß 	{$(7		{Æ,Æ0 where ß denotes the price and {  is the
magnitude of non-price attributes which are continuous,
nonnegative variables.
 Supplier k’s cost function ³ ,

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T

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	fl8
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is additive across attributes and T  f is increasing, convex
and twice continuously differentiable in {  .
 The auctioneer is assumed to know the form of the
suppliers’ cost function but not the actual parameter
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function of the buyer and the scoring rule is
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which is increasing and concave in {  . Further, to guar-
antee existence of solutions to the optimization problem,
described later, a set of technical requirements are im-
posed upon the cost, scoring and valuation functions.
The eRFQ mechanism is based upon an open ascending
auction format consisting of i   rounds. The first i
rounds enable learning of the i parameters, through Inverse
Optimization, and the last round is with an optimized scoring
rule. Ahuja and Orlin [96] describe Inverse Optimization in
the following manner: “A typical optimization problem is a
forward problem because it identifies the values of observable
parameters (optimal decision variables), given the values of
the model parameters (cost coefficients, right-hand side vector,
and the constraint matrix). An inverse optimization problem
consists of inferring the values of the model parameters (cost
coefficients, right-hand side vector, and the constraint matrix),
given the values of observable parameters (optimal decision
variables)”.
In each round of the auction, the buyer announces a scoring
rule in response to which suppliers submit bids. Activity
rules and transition rules are imposed to move from one
round to the other. In each round the buyer ranks the bids
according to the latest scoring rule and announces the rankings
without revealing the bidders or the actual bids. The winner
determination, at the end of i3 rounds, is based simply
upon an English auction like rule, with the bidder providing
the highest utility at the end of iÄ3 rounds being offered
the contract at his bid price.
The key questions that arise are: (1) what is the likely
bidding behavior of the suppliers; (2) how does the buyer esti-
mate the suppliers’ cost functions; and (3) how is the optimal
scoring rule determined after learning the cost functions.
Bidding Behavior of Suppliers: The supplier is assumed to
follow a myopic best response bidding behavior which is in
line with the approaches used in [97] and [66]. Here, the
supplier chooses his bid such that he maximizes his current
profit with the assumption that other suppliers do not change
their bids. The bid is chosen by solving the following Non-
Linear Optimization problem:
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In the final round however, the constraint would be:
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While the bidding behavior does not include a game theo-
retic analysis of competing suppliers, it still requires bidders
to be sophisticated enough to solve optimization problems.
This is striking a middle ground with respect to the bidders’
rationality.
Estimating cost functions of the suppliers: By virtue of the
auction design, the auctioneer at the end of i rounds has for
each attribute  and each supplier b , i equations. These i
equations obtained by solving the first order conditions for
u	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form a set of simultaneous linear equations. By solving this
set of equations for each supplier b the true cost parameters
for each attribute  can be obtained.
Computing the optimal scoring rule: After learning the
suppliers’ cost functions, the optimal scoring rule for round
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i c is computed by solving the following optimization
problem:
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The objective function maximizes the buyer’s utility with
the last three terms of (24) making up the winning suppliers
price; (36) is supplier " ’s maximum drop-out score; (37) and
(38) ensure that the top two suppliers participate in round
iéÅ .
In the model described above, assumptions about (1) undis-
torted bidding behavior by suppliers and (2) knowledge of
the form of the suppliers’ cost functions may be untenable in
practice. The authors propose several extensions to the basic
model in order to make it more robust. First, in developing
the scoring rule for the last round, the authors envisage three
problems: (a) a difficult mathematical programming problem
needs to be solved, (b) the scoring rule may turn out to be too
complex, and (c) the scoring rule may force the losing supplier
to submit bids with negligible values of non-price attributes.
To overcome these problems the authors propose (1) changing
the method of finding the best competitor, (2) providing the
scoring rules in graphical form, and (3) introducing lower
bound constraints on the attribute levels in the final round.
Secondly, the bidding behavior of suppliers may not follow
the undistortedness assumption either because of strategic
intentions of the supplier or the lack of sophistication on their
part. This would result in an inconsistent set of simultaneous
linear equations. The authors suggest using a weighted average
least squares procedure to reduce the effects of bid distortion.
We however would like to emphasize that this approach does
not absolve buyer of need to compute true utility.
D. Summary and Current Art
In this section we reviewed mechanisms designed for the
procurement of items with multiple attributes. We briefly
reviewed the approaches to multi-criteria decision making and
identified two broad categories of techniques - elimination
methods and weighted average methods. The crucial issue in
multi criteria procurement is the assignment of weights to each
of the attributes to facilitate the development of a scoring
function which captures the buyers’ utility. Two intelligent
approaches - the first relying on a central agency to indicate
a pairwise preference among a sample of received bids and
the second based upon estimating the suppliers cost functions,
were detailed.
Currently, developing efficient approaches for multi-
attribute procurement is an active research area. The reader is
referred to [101], [98], [99], [69], [54] for some recent work.
The papers [101], [99], [98] build upon the approaches de-
scribed above. Kameshwaran and Narahari [69] have proposed
an approach based on goal programming. Goal programming
(GP) is one of the tools of choice for multi criteria decision
analysis [102]. In [69], the authors show that GP can be used
to model procurement scenarios where suppliers provide bids
with congurable offers. Here the bids are assumed to be
piece-wise linear and the buyer has a hierarchy of goals or
aspiration levels which are to be satisfied. The authors propose
the use of Weighted GP, Lexicographic GP, and Interactive
Sequential GP techniques to solve the multi-attribute procure-
ment problem.
There are many issues that remain unresolved in multi-
attribute procurement. No single approach seems to work
uniformly well and it is intrinsically a challenging problem.
Much work remains to be done in all the areas: winner
determination algorithms, payment rules, and achieving truth
revelation.
We summarize the discussion on multi-attribute procure-
ment auctions by presenting Table X which gives snapshot of
the possible scenarios and a listing of relevant references.
VI. A CASE STUDY FROM GENERAL MOTORS
Procurement business professionals need to collect large
numbers of bids from prospective suppliers. They then de-
termine an allocation of awards to bids that minimizes the
procurement cost subject to a variety of constraints such
as vendor award count on commodities or subsets of com-
modities, logistics costs and supplier delivery risk. This need
is present during the initial stage of awarding business to
suppliers on new products, and is also present when primary
suppliers are unable to deliver supplies (e.g., in the case of
a strike, natural disaster, financial default, or other event that
causes a work stoppage) to existing products.
A team of researchers from General Motors Research
(which included the last four authors of this paper) recently
used an auction-optimization approach similar to those de-
scribed earlier in this paper to solve this problem. This
approach, soon to be deployed as a web application within
General Motors Corporation (GM Corp), allows business users
to determine an optimal allocation of awards to bids using
the application over the company’s intranet. Because the
optimization approach is math driven, automatic, and can be
rolled out over the businesses intranet, business users can now
focus on the business constraints that drive the award process.
Business users can dynamically adjust the business constraints
to understand the impact of the stated constraints on the award
allocation. That is, they can understand the sensitivity of the
awards to the constraint settings. This process can happen in
real time, thus making the procurement business professionals’
task much faster, thereby allowing them to focus on developing
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Multi-attribute Procurement Models Analysis References
Additive Value Models [98], [69], [99] [1], [100], [94], [23], [101], [51], [92], [2]
Inverse Optimization Models [95] [96]
TABLE X
CLASSIFICATION OF MULTI-ATTRIBUTE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
the relationship with suppliers rather than spending their time
crunching numbers in spreadsheets in an effort to discover
the optimal award allocation using more primitive manual
approaches.
The sourcing corresponds to that of an important raw
material for automotive manufacturing at GM. The overall
commodity sourcing process is shown in Figure 1. Within GM,
a huge amount of this commodity is sourced every year. To
gain maximum cost savings (at a sufficiently high level of
desired quality), GM uses a centralized demand aggregation
and reselling application for the whole supply chain. This
application attempts to combine the individual commodity
requirements of its processors with GM’s direct commodity
requirements to create large orders. These larger orders often
qualify for significant volume discounts with the commodity
suppliers. GM then resells a portion of the purchased com-
modity to its processors to cover their material needs. Some
of the processing is performed by external processors, and
the rest is done by GM’s internal processing group. So, the
overall process is very complex and manual approaches for
determining an allocation of awards to the suppliers require
enormous effort. Moreover, the solution may not be optimal.
By using an optimization model similar to those described
earlier in this paper, superior solutions can be obtained with
less effort.
A. System Overview
A general commodity sourcing application in the automotive
industry will look like the one shown in Figure 2. Here,
the overall process is the same as shown in Figure 1. The
requirements for the commodities are aggregated within a
centralized system (sourcing tool) and an effective bundling
of the commodity is found. The tool looks at the catalogs of
the approved suppliers and sends RFQs to each of the suppliers
for those bundles that they are capable of supplying. Each of
these suppliers submits a list of configurable bids to the tool
in response to the RFQ. The tool evaluates the bids and feeds
them into the optimization model. The optimization model is
also provided with plant specific constraints and other business
constraints. The tool outputs a cost effective allocation to the
suppliers.
The main elements of a configurable bid submitted by a
supplier are shown in the tree-like structure shown in Figure
3. A configurable bid gives either a base price for a bundle and
quantity, or a volume discount price, which is a function of
quantity. The bid consists of various attributes, which can be
fixed attributes, range attributes, or optional attributes. Fixed
attributes are simple attributes with one corresponding value.
Fig. 1. Overall Business Process
Range attributes allow suppliers to specify an attribute as a step
function, where each step has a fixed impact on price. Optional
attributes can either be included or not. A supplier can also
specify some logical rules for assigning some discounts to
specific combination of selected attributes.
B. A Model for Minimizing Procurement Spend
The commodity requirements of all the plants are aggre-
gated and bids are invited from the suppliers. Each plant has
a set of preferred suppliers for procuring the commodities.
Also, suppliers are capable of supplying certain commodities
to one or more particular plants. Each bid submitted has
variable and fixed cost components. They are submitted for
multiple units of multiple heterogeneous commodities destined
for multiple plants. There are some bounds on the number of
units of a particular commodity that a supplier can supply
to a plant. Also, there are some restrictions on the number
of suppliers that can be selected for a plant and also on
the number of suppliers that can be awarded business for a
commodity. All of these constraints are determined by taking
into consideration the suppliers’ capacities, their disruption
risk, their overhead costs, etc. The model that the team created
to solve the problem determines an efficient allocation of
awards to bids so that overall procurement cost is minimized,
and the various constraints on the number of suppliers for
a plant/commodity, bounds on the award to each supplier,
plant preferred suppliers, and other constraints are satisfied.
21
Fig. 2. Commodity Sourcing Application
Fig. 3. Main Elements of a Configurable Bid
The mathematical programming model used combines several
features of the formulations discussed in Sections III.B and
IV.B and extends those formulations with business constraints
unique to GM.
C. Results and Conclusions
Using the above approach, the team was able to determine
a cost minimizing potential re-allocation of awards that could
be used for negotiations with the current suppliers (A and B)
regarding the status of expiring contracts. The set of specialty
commodities that the team considered were C1, C2, C3, and
C4. The solution obtained by the conventional method (using
current suppliers A and B) gave an Annual Purchase Value
(APV) of $ 31.11 M while that obtained using our optimization
approach gave an APV of $ 30.4M. The results are shown in
Table XI and Table XII respectively. These preliminary results
gave significant savings of about $ 0.71M (2.3% of APV) in
a solution time in the single digit seconds range.
Also, the team considered how the optimization model
might be used to help determine an optimal supply re-
allocation strategy in the event of a supplier disruption event.
For this, the team considered the reallocation of a portion
of the commodity from one of the suppliers to two other
suppliers. Three scenarios were investigated:
1) Reallocating only the highest volume parts
2) Reallocating so as to minimize the total cost impact
3) Same as Scenario 1 above, but excluding certain parts
for reallocation
The results are shown in Table XII. So, if the number of
reallocations (Scenario 1) is sought to be minimized, the cost
impact is high ($ 3.2M). On the other hand, trying to minimize
the total cost impact increases the number of reallocations
to 280. Assuming a switching cost of approximately $10,000
for reallocating a part to a new supplier, the cost minimizing
reallocation has an impact of $ 2.7M with 146 reallocations.
In conclusion, the team demonstrated that significant cost
savings are possible when applying auctions and optimization
to a real-world procurement problem. The savings could be
as high as 3%. Of course, given that the analysis was limited
to a particular commodities group, there is reason to believe
that this estimate is only a lower bound on what is possible
using this approach. It was also shown that using this type
of modeling approach allows business analysts to explore
different constraints on the award and reallocation process.
This leads to a much better understanding of the sensitivity of
the business constraints to optimal sourcing decisions than was
previously possible using a more traditional manual process.
In the following section, we summarize the discussion in
this paper by providing a few concluding remarks and pointers
to potential research opportunities.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have surveyed the state-of-the-art in
auction-based mechanisms for automating negotiations in elec-
tronic procurement. We have discussed these mechanisms
under three categories:
 Single Item Auctions: Procurement of a single unit or
multiple units of a single item based on a single attribute
 Multi-Item Auctions: Procurement of a single unit or
multiple units of multiple items based on a single attribute
 Multi-Attribute Auctions: Procurement of a single unit
or multiple units of a single item based on multiple
attributes.
A fourth category would be: procurement of multiple units of
multiple items based on multiple attributes. Given that the first
three categories are areas of active research with unresolved
issues, this fourth category would be even more challenging. In
each of the three categories of procurement, we discussed sev-
eral procurement scenarios, provided problem formulations,
and discussed issues of computational complexity related to
the mechanism and the bidding process. We have also provided
a description of several case studies, including a detailed one
from General Motors.
Currently, procurement auctions is an active area of research
with many interesting problems which merit further study.
Here, we provide pointers to a few selected categories:
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Mill/Commodity C1 C2 C3 C4 Grand Total
A $107,010 $ 2,863,928 $ 7,069,270 $1,502,302 $ 11, 542, 510
B $303,039 $ 1, 739, 721 $ 10, 153, 908 $ 7, 367, 029 $ 19, 563, 697
Grand Total $ 410, 049 $ 4, 603, 649 $ 17, 223, 178 $ 8, 869, 331 $ 31, 106, 207
TABLE XI
CURRENT COMMODITY ALLOCATION (APV: $ 31.22M)
Mill/Commodity C1 C2 C3 C4 Grand Total
A - - - $5, 117, 764 $ 5, 117, 764
B $ 71, 708 $ 1, 629, 282 $ 7,600, 918 $1, 276, 440 $ 10, 578, 348
C $ 5, 981 $ 1, 763, 698 $ 6, 970, 686 - $ 8, 739, 365
D $ 277, 243 $ 1, 007, 565 $ 775, 921 $ 2, 182, 372 $ 4, 243, 101
E $ 27, 945 $ 176, 621 $ 1, 513, 435 - $ 1, 718, 001
Grand Total $ 382, 877 $ 4, 577, 166 $ 16, 860, 960 $ 8, 576, 576 $ 30, 396, 579
Savings ($) $ 27, 172 $ 27, 483 $ 362, 218 $ 292, 755 $ 709, 628
Savings (%) 6.627 % 0.597% 2.103 % 3.301% 2.2813 %
TABLE XII
OPTIMAL COMMODITY ALLOCATION (APV: $ 30.40M)
Scenario Cost Impact (Increase) No. of Reallocations
1 $ 3.2M 77
2 $ 2.5 M 280
3 $ 3.8M 81
TABLE XIII
REALLOCATION OF MATERIAL
Winner Determination Problem in Procurement Auctions
Though extensive work has been done on solving the winner
determination problem in different types of procurement auc-
tions, there is still wide scope for future work here. One of the
promising directions is to come up with efficient approxima-
tion algorithms with provable bounds for solving the winner
determination problem. There are many efforts in this direction
already, see for example, [54], [65]. The rich body of literature
available in combinatorial optimization and approximation and
randomized algorithms will be extremely useful here. Another
key opportunity here is in the area of on-line algorithms. In
many situations, it becomes imperative to quickly evaluate the
bids received and allocate quantities/orders to suppliers. In
such situations, on-line algorithms would be useful. As of the
present art, there is not much work in this direction and this
would be a valuable topic for further investigation.
Iterative Procurement Auctions
As already stated in the paper, iterative mechanisms have
several advantages over one shot mechanisms. Also, there have
been several iterative mechanisms developed for procurement
[41], [74], [79], [90], [103]. Iterative mechanisms are ap-
pealing to the buyer and suppliers because they enable the
bidders to apply corrections to their bids in a continuous way.
More work is required in ensuring that iterative mechanisms
satisfy desirable economic properties also. The use of on-line
algorithms for rapid winner determination in successive rounds
of bidding is an important direction for future work.
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
Inducing truth revelation will continue to be a major is-
sue in the design of procurement mechanisms. Designing
such mechanisms has intrinsic difficulties such as very high
computational complexity and loss of efficiency. It would be
interesting to study how the use of approximate algorithms for
winner determination and payment computation would affect
incentive compatibility. There is already a fair amount of work
in this direction [65], [84], [56].
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Optimal Procurement Auctions
Based on the work of Myerson [48], it would be interesting
to investigate cost minimizing procurement auctions subject
to individual rationality and Bayesian incentive compatibil-
ity constraints. Myerson’s work considers forward auction
(selling) of a single indivisible item. Extending the work to
procurement auction of multiple units and items would be
quite challenging.
Multi-Attribute Procurement
Multi-attribute procurement is an intrinsically difficult prob-
lem, but at the same time an important problem that needs
immediate attention. There are a few results available [92],
[98], [103] and there are a few promising approaches such as
goal programming [69], but much more needs to be researched
in this area.
Use of Learning in Procurement Auctions
Procurement auctions provide an ideal platform for use
of machine learning techniques in improving the efficiency
of the process. The history of bidding by a supplier is an
important parameter for winner determination. To incorporate
history into procurement decision making will call for use of
appropriate machine learning techniques such as reinforcement
learning. Learning based models would be useful in iterative
procurement auctions to help the buyer estimate the cost
functions of the suppliers and in optimally incrementing the
procurement budgets. One such application is discussed in
[80]. Another interesting application is discussed in [104]. We
believe machine learning techniques have powerful applica-
tions in procurement auctions.
Procurement Auctions from a Total Supply Chain Perspective
It is important to design procurement mechanisms based on
a total cost approach where the total cost captures all aspects
of the entire supply chain. This has been explored in a few
papers already [55] but a deeper understanding and a more
systematic approach is required here.
Deployment Issues
Practical deployment of procurement auctions will throw
up numerous challenges. Several authors have addressed these
issues: security of transactions [105]; collusion of suppli-
ers [57]; user interface issues [101]; fairness issues [33];
failure freeness and robustness against failures [33], [105],
[60]. These issues need immediate attention for successful
adoption of auctions by purchasing departments. Designing
software implementation frameworks so as to allow sensitivity
analysis of procurement decisions in complex supply chain
environments is also an important issue. Use of multi-agent
agent technology in automating standard electronic procure-
ment problems is one more issue. Using emerging Internet
technology standards such as ebXML in implementing e-
procurement solutions is an immediate practical issue.
Procurement Exchanges
Procurement exchanges are those where there are multiple
buyers and multiple suppliers and the exchange facilitates
matching of buyers with suppliers. All the issues become more
complex with exchanges because of the presence of multiple
buyers. There is a large body of literature on exchanges; for
example, see [106], [24], [107].
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